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THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS:
A TIMELY REAPPRAISAL OF A
DISCRIMINATORY SCHEME
The uncompensated victim of highway negligence has been a constant
source of state legislative concern for almost fifty years.' In California,
where almost ten percent of the nation's highway fatalities occur, this
concern has been understandably acute.2 Appropriately, in order to
protect its residents from drivers who are both careless and judgmentproof, California enacted the Financial Responsibility Laws in 1929.8
1. In 1925 Massachusetts adopted a compulsory insurance statute, requiring proof of
adequate liability insurance or other evidence of ability to satisfy a judgment as a prerequisite to issuance of a driver's license. MAss. LAWS ch. 346 § 2 (1925) (now
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, H9 34A-34N (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1972)).
That same year Connecticut enacted the first of the financial responsibility laws, providing for suspension of registration of those drivers causing accidents of specified economic gravity, with restoration of license available upon a showing of financial responsibility. CONN. AcTs ch. 183 (1925) (now CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 246,
H9 14-117, 14-120, 14-125 (1970)).
2. U.S. BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNtrD STATES 540. Based on figures from 1968, total deaths from motor
vehicle accidents in the nation amounted to 54,862, 5,048 of which deaths occurred in
California. Statistics compiled for the years 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1968 show
California traffic deaths to be approximately ten percent of the nation's total. Id.
3. Ch. 258, § 4, [1929] Cal. Stat. 558 (codified at CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 1600016560 (West 1971)).
Briefly, the Code requires a report to be made to the Department of Motor Vehicles
by drivers involved in accidents resulting in property damage in excess of $200 or in
personal injuries. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 16000 (West 1971). Unless the driver was
operating his employer's vehicle or can otherwise qualify for one of the exemptions
specifically provided, the driver must deposit security in the amount which, in the opinion
of the Department, will satisfy any judgments which may be recovered against him. Id.
H§ 16002 (vehicle of employer), 16020 (security deposit), 16050-60 (exemptions).
This security deposit is then made available for payment of final judgments or settlement agreements. Id. § 16026.
Exemptions to the security requirement are available if the vehicle involved is publicly owned (Id. § 16051), if the vehicle was parked at the time of the accident,
or if no damage or injury was caused (Id. § 16052), if a release from liability, adjudication of nonliability, or settlement agreement is shown (id. § 16053), or if the owner
of the vehicle qualifies as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance upon
a showing that the person owns twenty-five or more vehicles. Id. § 16055. Usually,
however, exemptions will be established by showing evidence of either insurance coverage
or a bond with respect to liability arising from operation of the vehicle. Id. § 16057.
Failure of a driver to deposit security as required or to qualify for an exemption will
result in suspension of his driving privileges, auto registration and license plates. Id.
§§ 16080, 16100. This suspension will continue until security is deposited, or the driver
establishes his exemption from the security requirement, or the suspension has been in
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Similar legislative schemes are now found in all but three states. 4

The California statutes are designed to encourage drivers to prepare
themselves financially against potential tort liability. For most persons,
however, such financial preparation necessitates the procurement of

automobile liability insurance.

Although liability insurance is not

required as a condition to the issuance of a driver's license, if a driver

becomes involved in an auto accident, he will be ordered to produce
proof of insurance coverage or some other form of financial security.5
If he is unable to produce evidence of financial security, the driver will

suffer the suspension of his operator's license, auto registration and
license plates.6 Similarly, if the issue of liability is adjudicated, failure

to satisfy a7 judgment will result in the suspension of license, registration
and plates.

effect for one year without an action being filed against the driver. Id. § 16105.

In the

latter event, the driver's license will not be reinstated until the driver can also establish
his future ability to respond in damages. Id. § 16082.
Judgments obtained on a cause of action for damages to property in excess of $200
or for personal injuries in any amount which are left unsatisfied for thirty days will
result in a mandatory suspension of the judgment-debtor's driver's license and the
registration and license plates of all motor vehicles registered in his name. Id. § 16370.
This suspension will remain in effect until the judgment is satisfied and the judgmentdebtor gives proof of future ability to respond in damages. Id. § 16371. A discharge
in bankruptcy does not relieve a judgment-debtor of any of the requirements of the
Act. Id. § 16372. See text accompanying notes 15-47 for a discussion relating to the
infirmities of this section.
Suspension for failure to satisfy a judgment may be avoided if the judgment-debtor
can prove his financial responsibility for future damages and the trial court orders
the judgment to be paid in installments. Id. § 16379. A default in an installment
payment, however, will result in the suspension "forthwith" of driver's license, auto registration and license plates until the judgment is satisfied. Id. § 16381.
Suspension penalties for failure to satisfy judgments will be terminated and privileges
restored after three years, even though the judgment remains unsatisfied, provided
the judgment-debtor files proof of ability to respond in damages. Id. § 16482.
Persons required to furnish proof of ability to respond in damages may be released
from that requirement after three years, provided they have not had their license
suspended during that period. Id. § 16480.
4. A complete list of citations to the state statutes can be found in Comment, A
Survey of FinancialResponsibility Laws and Compensation of Traffic Victims: A Proposal for Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1050, 1081-82 app. B (1968). Three states have
opted for compulsory insurance rather than the financial responsibility scheme. See
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 34A-34N (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1972); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAFFIc LAW § 312 (McKinney 1970), as amended (Supp. 1971-1972); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ch. 20 § 20-309-20-319 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1969). Florida,
Delaware and Illinois have recently adopted compulsory insurance programs which are
to commence in 1972. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 28, 1971, at 15.
5. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. H9 16020, 16050-60 (West 1971).
6. Id. 9H 16080, 16100.
7. Id. § 16370.
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Not surprisingly, the suspension of driver's licenses has inspired a
variety of challenges to the constitutionality of several state statutes.
Arguments have been couched in terms of denial of due process, denial
of equal protection on the basis of wealth, bill of attainder, self-incrimination and improper delegation of judicial authority.8 With very few
exceptions, 9 however, the state courts have resisted the persuasion of
these arguments and have upheld the suspension provisions.' 0 In so
doing, the courts have emphasized that the police power, when exercised to provide compensation for victims of auto accidents, serves a
legitimate state purpose." This judicial accentuation on the valid exercise of the police power in the area of automobile accident compensation, however, must now be reevaluated in light of the California Supreme Court's recent expansion of due process protections in areas other
than financial responsibility. 2 Two recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court similarly compel a reappraisal of the constitutionality of various provisions of state financial responsibility laws. Specifically, a statute commonly employed to reinforce the suspension of licenses
for failure to satisfy judgments was recently ruled invalid under the
Supremacy Clause after the Supreme Court determined that the state
8. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 421 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
402 U.S. 637 (1971) (suspension of license for failure to satisfy judgments arising out
of automobile accidents does not constitute a bill of attainder); Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950) (suspension of license
following an accident is not a denial of due process; authority of the Department of
Motor Vehicles to determine the amount of security to be deposited does not constitute
an improper delegation of judicial power); Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212
Cal. 279, 298 P. 481 (1931) (suspension of license for failure to satisfy judgments arising out of automobile accidents does not discriminate against the poor); Surtman v.
Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471 (1944) (financial responsibility laws
are not invalid on grounds that they require self-incrimination); Commonwealth v.
Koczwara, 78 Pa. D. & C. 6 (1951) (suspension of license for failure to deposit security
following an accident is not a denial of due process).
9. In re Lindley, 108 Cal. App. 258, 291 P. 638 (1930) (holding that suspension of
license for failure to satisfy judgments arising out of automobile accidents discriminates
on the basis of wealth and violates due process); People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180
(Colo. 1961) (holding that the suspension of license for failure to deposit security
following an accident violates due process).
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey,
314 U.S. 33 (1941); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963);
See generally Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn,
505 (1936); Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAw &
CONTEMp. PROB. 519 (1936); Pricer & Wyckoff, Practices and Procedures of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 14 HAsT. L.J. 355, 368-73 (1963).
12. See Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971).
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statute conflicted with the Federal Bankruptcy Act.13 In addition, the
Court has held that the summary nature of the suspension for failure
to provide security following an accident must be revised to accommodate a hearing prior to suspension. 14
The issues discussed herein will include the impact which these recent
decisions will have upon state financial responsibility laws in general,
and the California statutes in particular. An examination of the contention that financial responsibility laws deny equal protection to the
poor will also be made. Finally, the latest California Supreme Court
decision on the requirements of procedural due process in this area
will be contrasted with a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court.
I.

PEREZ V. CAMPBELL: STATE STATUTORY
CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL

LAW

In Perez v. Campbell, 5 the Supreme Court recently invalidated an
Arizona statute which authorized the suspension of a judgment-debtor's
driver's license and auto registration where the judgment was left
unsatisfied, despite a discharge of the judgment in bankruptcy. Under
the provisions of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
a discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve a judgment-debtor from the
requirements of the Act. 6 Thus, when a judgment against a discharged
debtor remains unsatisfied for sixty days, the license and registration
of a judgment-debtor is automatically suspended. This suspension is
to remain in effect until both the judgment is satisfied and proof is shown
of financial responsibility for a future period. 1 7 Petitioners, husband
and wife, were Arizona residents. Both had confessed judgment in an
action arising out of the husband's negligent operation of their community property automobile.' 8 Although Mr. and Mrs. Perez each filed
13. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
14. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) [For discussion see text accompanying
notes 115-144]. See CAL. VEE. CODE ANN. §§ 16080, 16100 (West 1971).
15. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
16. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (1956). Accord, CAL. VEH. CODE ANN.
§ 16372 (West 1971).
17. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1161(A), 28-1162(A), 28-1163(A) (1956). Accord, CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16370-71 (West 1971).
18. 402 U.S. at 638. Although Mrs. Perez was not present at the time of the accident and was not at fault in any manner, under Arizona community property laws she
was a proper nominal party defendant in the action and a nominal judgment-debtor with
respect to the community property. Donato v. Fishbum, 90 Ariz. 210, 367 P.2d 245
(1961).
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a petition in bankruptcy and subsequently were discharged from the
judgment against them, both were served with notice that their driver's
licenses and auto registration were suspended for failure to pay the
judgment.' 9
Proceeding in forma pauperis, Mr. and Mrs. Perez filed for injunctive
and declaratory relief in the United States district court.20 Although
the petitioners challenged the Arizona Act on several constitutional
grounds, 2 ' their complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim
under which relief could be granted, and the court of appeals affirmed.22 Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was
subsequently granted.2
Justice White's majority opinion considered only whether the Arizona
Act was in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and thus invalid under the
Supremacy Clause insofar as it denied the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy.2 4 Specifically, the question presented was whether a state has
the power, as part of a statutory scheme intended for the financial protection of auto accident victims, to suspend the driving privileges of a
judgment-debtor, despite a discharge of the debt in bankruptcy.
It would appear beyond dispute that the Arizona Act was directly in
conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The Supreme Court has described the power of Congress to establish uniform laws on bankruptcies
as "unrestricted and paramount, ' 25 excluding by clear implication any
state laws which interfere with or complement federal regulation.2 0 The
Bankruptcy Act is intended to give debtors "a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."12 7 Since it is well settled that a judgment for tort is a provable debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, 28 a tort
19. 402 U.S. at 641. See Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1162(A) (1956).
§ 16370 (West 1971).

Accord,

CAL. VEH. CODE ANN.

20. Perez v. Campbell, 421 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 402
U.S. 637 (1971). Relief was prayed for pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201 (1970).
21. The petitioners asserted (1) that the Arizona statute was in conflict with the
Federal Bankruptcy Act and thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause, (2) that it
operated discriminatorily on the poor, and (3) that it unfairly penalized an innocent
spouse in a community property state. 421 F.2d at 621-23.
22. Id. at 621.
23. Perez v. Campbell, 400 U.S. 818 (1970).
24. 402 U.S. at 643.
25. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
26. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
27. Id. at 244. Accord, Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
28. Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
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judgment-debtor clearly is encompassed within the scope and purpose
of the Act.
Nevertheless, as recently as 1962 the Supreme Court upheld a Utah
statute similar to the Arizona provision in question in Perez.2 9 In Kesler
v. Department of Public Safety3" the Court found that the state statute
in question was an appropriate measure for promoting highway safety
and was not intended to subvert the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act."
The Kesler Court noted the precedent established in Reitz v. Mealy,"
where a financial responsibility law was viewed as a safety measure
intended to prevent injury from careless and irresponsible drivers. This
public policy would be frustrated if a reckless driver were permitted
to escape judgments obtained against him by "the simple expedient of
voluntary bankruptcy." 33 The Kesler Court recognized that states are
not forbidden from attaching any consequences whatsoever to debts
discharged in bankruptcy, 34 and concluded that where the police power
of the state was exerted to protect life and limb it should not be frustrated
because of a tangential bearing on the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. 5
Thus, under Reitz and Kesler, an expeditious finding that state statutes
were intended to be safety measures would suffice to prevent their invalidation under the Supremacy Clause.
In Perez, however, the Court was no longer inclined to denominate
a financial responsibility act as a "safety measure." Both Kesler and
Reitz had divined the purpose of the statutes in question without citing
state court authority and, to this extent, these decisions omitted a basic
step in the proper analysis of Supremacy Clause issues.36 Recognizing
these prior omissions, the Perez Court employed a two-step approach
to the resolution of the Supremacy Clause issue. First, the proper construction of the Arizona statute was ascertained through an examination
29. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 173-74. But see Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1970).

32. 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
33. 369 U.S. at 169, citing Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. at 37.
34. 369 U.S. at 170-71, citing Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 629 (1913) (despite
a discharge in bankruptcy, a moral obligation to pay a debt remains, and is sufficient
to permit enforcement of a new promise subsequent to discharge even though the
promise is not supported by new consideration); Spalding v. New York ex rel Backus,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 21 (1846) (bankruptcy does not prevent a state from collecting and
turning over to a creditor a fine for contempt of an injunction issued to aid in the
execution of a judgment debt).
35. 369 U.S. at 172.
36. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 650 (1971).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

of relevant Arizona decisions. The Bankruptcy Act was similarly considered in light of Supreme Court decisions.

The two statutes were

then compared to determine whether a conflict existed.

7

If the state

statute was found to stand as "'an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. .. ' ", it would
38
fail the constitutional test.

Arizona decisional law revealed that the primary purpose of the
Arizona Act was to assure compensation for accident victims, rather
than to deter highway negligence. 39 When this purpose was compared
with the purposes underlying the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 40 it was clear
that the federal law and the Arizona statute were irreconcilable. Since
the statute operated as an impediment to the accomplishment of the
purposes and objectives of Congress, it was rendered invalid under the
41
Supremacy Clause.

California's Vehicle Code section 16372 is substantively identical
to the Arizona statute which was held invalid in Perez.4 2 The Cali37. Id. at 644.
38. Id. at 649, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
39. 402 U.S. at 644; Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136,
140 (1963):
The Financial Responsibility Act has for its principal purpose the protection of
the public using the highways from financial hardship which may result from the
use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.
See Camacho v. Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558, 456 P.2d 925, 928 (1969); Sandoval v.
Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 243, 428 P.2d 98, 100 (1967). Accord, Continental Cas.
Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 434, 296 P.2d 801, 808 (1956). The purpose of the California financial responsibility law is
to give monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of
persons who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injury
through the negligent use of those highways by others.
Even under the rationale of Kesler and Reitz, the Arizona statute could not be upheld. 402 U.S. at 654. The statute does not have merely a tangential bearing on the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, but is in direct conflict with that Act. Id. Further,
it appears that the enactment was not primarily a result of the exercise of the pervasive police power to protect life and limb. The Perez Court was persuaded that the
many avenues available for avoidance of suspension under the Arizona Act supported
the construction in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963), that
the legislation was not intended primarily as a safety measure. 402 U.S. at 646-48.
Under the Arizona law, a negligent driver may retain his license and registration if he
obtains a release from the victim or enters into a settlement agreement providing for
payment in installments. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1143(A)(4) (West 1956).
Accord, CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 16053 (West 1971). Further, the Court cited the
absence of a mandatory driver-improvement course for those drivers who cause accidents--a practice in some state traffic courts. 402 U.S. at 648.
40. The major purpose underlying the Bankruptcy Act is noted in Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (to give debtors a new opportunity in life unencumbered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt).
41. 402 U.S. at 652.
42. See note 16 supra.
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fornia financial responsibility laws have also been construed as a compensatory measure for the protection of accident victims rather than as
a safety measure directed at deterring negligent drivers. In the leading
case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co.,43 the
California Supreme Court determined that the purpose of the financial
responsibility laws was "to give monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons who while lawfully using the
highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of
'
As such, under the mandate of Perez,
those highways by others."44
section 16372 is clearly violative of the Supremacy Clause.
The holding in Perez, however, is not limited in application to similar sections of financial responsibility laws which, as in Arizona and
California, are intended to provide compensation rather than deter
highway negligence. The Kesler and Reitz decisions were aberrational
not only in the manner in which they assumed the safety purpose of
the statutes but also in their basic approach to the Supremacy Clause
issue. In both cases, state enactments which denied effect to a discharge in bankruptcy were upheld on the ground that the purpose of
the state legislature was not to frustrate the federal law but rather to
promote safety. 45 In Perez, the Court commented that
such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all
unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee
report articulating some state interest or policy--other than frustration
of the federal objective-that would be tangentially furthered by the
46
proposed state law.
Thus, regardless of the purpose of the legislation, state enactments are
invalid under the Supremacy Clause if they have the effect of frustrating
the operation of federal law.4 7
43. 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
44. Id. at 434, 296 P.2d at 808.
45. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 154 (1962):
The Statute before us is Utah's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act-a measure
directed towards promoting safety in automobile traffic by administrative and
compensatory remedies calculated to restrain careless driving. Its purpose is
wholly unrelated to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 37 (1941):
The penalty which § 94-b [of the New York financial responsibility law] imposes
for injury due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely,
but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity,
be allowed to injure their fellows .... Such legislation is not in derogation of
the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy
touching highway safety.
46. 402 U.S. at 652.
47. Id.
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT INFIRMITIES

A.

Equal Protection

While the holding in Perez dealt only with the invalidity of a single
provision in Arizona's financial responsibility laws, it is submitted that
the very foundation of those and similar laws rests on constitutionally
infirm grounds.48 For example, California Vehicle Code section
i6020, though subject to various exemptions, 49 requires a security deposit or other demonstration of financial responsibility by all persons
involved in an auto accident which may result in a judgment in excess
of two hundred dollars for property damage or in any amount for
bodily injury.5 0 On its face the statute affects all persons equally.
However, its potential invalidity lies in the manner and method in
48. The remaining focus of this Comment is primarily devoted to pre-judgment procedure and suspension. However, it should be noted that in California, as well as in
Arizona, unsatisfied judgments arising from the operation of a motor vehicle will
CAL. VEH.
result in suspension of the judgment-debtor's license and registration.
CODE ANN. § 16370 (West 1971); Aiuz. REv. STAT. AN'N. § 28-1162(A) (1956). The
statutes have been construed to apply to judgment-debtors who, though not personally
at fault, are nonetheless vicariously liable. See Sheehan v. Division of Motor Vehicles,
140 Cal. App. 200, 35 P.2d 359 (1934); accord, Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz.
273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963). The result is particularly odious if invoked against the
innocent wife named as a party defendant. Although the Supreme Court did not
adjudicate the issue, this in fact was the case in Perez. 402 U.S. at 653 n.14.
While liability does not attach to the wife in California if the automobile is community property, should the vehicle be held in tenancy-in-common or in joint tenancy
the wife co-owner may be liable for the imputed negligence of her spouse. Wilcox v.
Berry, 32 Cal. 2d 189, 195 P.2d 414 (1948). See CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 17150
(West 1971). The innocent wife's driver's license may thus be suspended as a result
of her husband's negligence. See Cooke v. Tsipouraglou, 59 Cal, 2d 660, 381 P.2d
940, 31 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1963); Charles, Ending the Separate Property Presumption in
Auto Accident Cases, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 715 (1965).
To impute the husband's negligence to the wife on the basis of the statutory legal
fiction of implied consent, and thus to subject her to license suspension under these
circumstances, would constitute an arbitrary policy denying the wife fundamental fairness required by due process. Furthermore, suspension without fault in this situation
would be unreasonable and would serve no purpose. The wife has not been adjudged
negligent, and thus the public interest in highway safety would not be promoted by
punishing the innocent spouse. Nor is she generally able to procure insurance for the
financial protection of the victims of her husband's automotive accidents, since the
managerial power over community assets is left to the husband. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5125 (West 1970). In this factual context, vicarious liability coupled with license
suspension would serve no substantial relation to the objects purported to be served
by the statutory application and fundamental principles of due process would thus be
put in potential jeopardy. See Miller v. Depuy; 307 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Commonwealth v. Bates, 17 Pa. D. & C. 626 (1932).
49. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16050-60 (West 1971); see note 3 supra.
50. CAL. VEN. CODE ANN. § 16020 (West 1971).
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which it is applied. 5 '

The lower financial stratum of society will be

the class most likely to feel the weight of the security requirement.
Not being in a position to deposit security, this class will effectively
be penalized under the suspension provisions, which provide that the
failure of a driver to deposit security or to qualify for an exemption will
result in the suspension of his driver's license, auto registration, and

license plates.

52

While the suspension for failure to deposit security following an accident has been upheld by various state courts against the challenge that

such statutes deny equal protection of the laws to the poor,5" it is
doubtful that the reasoning in those decisions remains valid in light

of subsequent United States Supreme Court rulings regarding discriminatory line-drawing by the states on the basis of wealth.5"

A

51. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that an otherwise valid
statute is invalid if unconstitutionally applied).
52. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16080, 16100 (West 1971). The harsh manner in
which the financial responsibility laws operate against the poor was recognized in
California as early as 1930. In In re Lindley, 108 Cal. App. 258, 260-61, 291 P.
638, 639 (1930), overruled on other grounds, Watson v. State Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P. 481 (1931), the court stated:
The provision for cancellation of license to drive based upon the ability to satisfy
a money damage judgment gives to the person of means a distinct advantage which
has no connection whatsoever with his ability to drive, and deprives another person
of a valuable property right because of his lack of means, thus unfairly discriminating against him. This is in the nature of providing a penalty and amounts
to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and should not be tolerated.
The statutes in 1930, as do the present statutes, permitted those drivers capable of
paying judgments against them to retain their operator's licenses and registration, regardless of how careless they were, while those too poor to satisfy judgments against
them suffered the loss of driving privileges. California Vehicle Act of 1929, § 73(g),

[1929] Cal. Stat. 561, as amended, CAL.

VEH. CODE ANN.

§ 16370 (West 1971).

Al-

though in 1931 the California Supreme Court denied the contention that the statute
discriminated unfairly on the basis of wealth (Watson v. State Div. of Motor Vehicles,
212 Cal. 279, 284, 298 P. 481, 483 (1931)), the legislature headed off further challenges on those grounds by adding section 16379 to the Vehicle Code. See Vehicle
Code of 1935, ch. 27, § 416, [1935] Cal. Stat. 159-60 (codified at CAL. VEH. CODE ANN.
§ 16379 (West 1971)). Section 16379 permits judgment-debtors who have either insufficient insurance or no insurance at all to satisfy judgments in installments without
losing their license. Although the section has not been challenged in the court on an
equal protection theory, it would appear that little strength remains in the argument
that the impoverished judgment-debtor may lose his license because of line-drawing by
the state on the basis of wealth. However, no provision similar to the installment plan
for judgment-debtors exists to relieve the license suspension of those who cannot provide security.
53. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d
1 (1950); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); State v. Finley, 198
Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967)y Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620
(1952).
54. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v.
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reappraisal of the operational effect of such suspension provisions
and their impact on persons of meager financial means is in order.

Consideration must be given both to the legislative purpose which
the statutes purport to serve and to the nature of the individual interest
affected.

In California, the security provision of section 16020 has a substantial impact only upon those persons financially unable to meet the

security requirements. 55

Upper and middle class drivers generally

may choose the means to avoid license suspension-whether by obtaining liability insurance, by depositing security or possibly by qualifying as self-insurers. 6 Since a self-insurer has to be the registered
owner of at least twenty-five cars, or post a $15,000 to $30,000 security bond in lieu thereof, it is doubtful that a lower-middle class
driver could qualify. The only available alternative, therefore, is
liability insurance.

Nevertheless, even this alternative may be un-

attainable in light of the practical circumstances of poverty which increase the cost of liability insurance simply as a consequence of being

poor. Persons in the lowest income stratum often find housing availCalifornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950),
the court relied upon Watson v. State Div. of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 P.
480 (1931), in affirming the validity of the financial responsibility laws. The Watson
court had stated:
The fallacy in this argument [that suspension discriminates against the poor] lies
in the failure to distinguish between equality of opportunity and ability to take
advantage of the opportunity which is offered to all. . . . The equality of the
Constitution is the equality of right and not of enjoyment. A law that confers
equal rights on all citizens of the state, or subjects them to equal burdens, is an
equal law. Id. at 284, 298 P. at 483 (citation omitted).
The Watson court was persuaded to this position by the advisory opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to the legislature of that state in In re Opinion of the Justices,
251 Mass. 617, 618, 147 N.E. 680, 680-81 (1925), wherein it was stated:
We think that the Legislature may declare that no person shall have a license to
operate a motor vehicle upon public ways until he has satisfied any outstanding
judgment against him founded on previous operation of a motor vehicle. A
statute of that nature may have a tendency to prevent conduct by a licensee capable of being the basis of such a judgment, and thus promote the public safety. It
would have a tendency to keep off the highway those shown by their conduct to
be dangerous to other travellers. It may be thought by the Legislature that such a
judgment debtor . . . was not a fit person to be intrusted again with the responsibility of operating a motor vehicle on the public ways.
It is questionable whether this reasoning would be valid today in the light of the United
States Supreme Court decisions, supra, holding state line-drawing on the basis of
wealth invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws.
55. See generally O'Keefe, The Indigent Motorist and the Constitution, 4 S. CAL. L.
REv. 253 (1931); Comment, The Constitutionality of the California Financial Responsibility Law, 4 CAL. W. L. Rav. 89 (1968).
56. See CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16050-60 (West 1971) (exemptions from the
security requirement).
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able only in high density urban areas.

As a result, they are required

to pay much higher premiums than are those who live in a suburban
community. 57 The frequent inability of the poor to come forward with
insurance policies increases the probability that they will ultimately

suffer license and registration suspension. Thus, in its practical effect,
section 16020 inescapably discriminates on the basis of wealth.5"
The security and suspension provisions are not invalid merely because

they weigh more heavily on the poor than on persons of financial
means.

While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment does not require absolute equality, state enactments may not
impose special burdens on certain groups unless the laws serve legiti-

mate legislative purposes and do not discriminate invidiously.5 9 The
traditional equal protection standard requires a reasonable relationship
between classifications created by state line-drawing and the purpose
for which the classifications are made. 0 The validity of the financialresponsibility laws, therefore, depends upon whether there exists a

reasonable relationship between the legislative purpose of providing
a pre-judgment fund for possible compensation of victims of negligent
57. FTC, DVsioN OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, REPORT ON PRicE VARiABILIY IN THE

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE MARKET 97 (1970): "Exceptionally high prices overall result
from the combination of high loss potential buyers in high density territories." Whether
an individual "lives in squalor or in attractive and orderly surroundings; how he dresses
and acts; whether he changes jobs frequently or is vocationally stable" are all factors
which are considered in insurance underwriting.
Id.
See also OLSON, THE
PRicE AND AVAILiBILITY OF AUTOMOBILE LTADILriY INSURANCE IN THE NONSTANDARD
MARKET (1971).
Judicial notice of the plight of the poor in the insurance market was taken in Miller
v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1970), where the court stated:
[O]ne cannot ignore the facts of present-day urban existence. A combination of
public and private policies have made use of an automobile an actual necessity for
virtually everyone who must work for a living. For the urban poor, in particular,
remoteness from the thriving suburban segment of the industrial economy and a
deteriorating public transportation system often make use of an automobile the
only practical alternative to welfare. There is, of course, the option of insuring adequately. But for the same urban poor the skyrocketing cost of automobile
insurance, for which they pay higher premiums than their more affluent suburban
neighbors, often makes that alternative impractical.
58. Cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
59. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-57 (1963).
60. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Linds-

ley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d
100, 110, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261 (1970). See generally Wood v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 300-08, 481 P.2d 823, 831-38, 93 Cal. Rptr.
455, 463-70 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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drivers and the adopted means of suspending driver's licenses for

failure to provide security following an accident. In order to justify
these means, there must appear a sufficiently rational correlation between an individual's lack of insurance or inability to deposit security,
and financial irresponsibility.6 1
The purpose of the financial responsibility laws generally is to pro-

vide a fund from which the victim of a negligent driver may be compensated after judgment. 62 The security requirement, however, is merely

supplemental to the accomplishment of this general purpose.03 Whether
the security provision is successful in accomplishing its purpose is dependent upon the effectiveness of the threat of suspension as an inducement to the voluntary purchase of liability insurance.

And whether

the threatened suspension will actually be invoked is determined by
the financial means of those who become involved in auto accidents
and who must therefore comply with the requirements of the financial
responsibility laws. As has been shown, the suspension provision will
be invoked primarily against those persons who are financially unable
to post security or to obtain liability insurance. While the threat of
suspension encourages persons of means to voluntarily insure or to take
other financial precautions against the possibility of having to deposit

security, the same provision has no such effect upon the poor. As
it applies to them, the suspension provision has no relation to the
61. See Wood v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 301, 480 P.2d 823, 832,
93 Cal. Rptr. 455,464 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
62. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz.
273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal.
2d 423, 434, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
63. Initially the purposes of financial responsibility laws were achieved by the
threat of suspension of license and registration where judgments were left unsatisfied.
Future victims of a negligent driver were protected by the further requirement that
proof of future ability to respond in damages be shown before a suspended license
would be reinstated. See CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 16379 (West 1971). See generally
Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Feinsinger, The Operation
of FinancialResponsibility Laws, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 519 (1936). The earlier
financial responsibility laws, however, were generally considered to be inadequate for
the protection of a negligent driver's first victim. Careless drivers who were financially
irresponsible were given "one free bite" because of the victim's lack of incentive to
bring an action or to enforce a judgment. By the adoption of security requirements,
the first victim of a negligent driver was given some assurance that an action against
a potential defendant would be worth pursuing. Once the action was commenced, the
amount deposited as security or the existing insurance coverage would be available to
satisfy a judgment. Thus, the security requirement supplements the threat of suspension for failure to satisfy a judgment, and provides the first victim of a careless driver
with a financially responsible defendant. See Hayes, Are the Financial Responsibility
Laws in Need of Revision?, 4 INs. COUNSEL J. 617, 618 (1971).
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purpose of providing a fund for compensation.

In fact, the suspension

provision when invoked against the poor often has the adverse effect

of decreasing the probability of victim recovery after judgment since
the licensee is denied a mode of transportation that may be essential

to his continued employment. 64
Additionally, an individual's inability to procure insurance or to
provide a bond for security prior to the institution of a legal action

against him does not relate to that person's ability to satisfy a potential
judgment. While poverty may prevent some persons from voluntarily

paying insurance premiums-the amounts of which may be entirely
out of proportion to their income-this fact does not necessarily indicate that they will be unable to pay a judgment under the installment
provision of the Vehicle Code.6 5 Since the installment section does not
specify a minimum amount for an installment payment, the trial judge

may set an amount which may be less burdensome than insurance
premiums. 66

If the suspension for failure to deposit security is to be upheld against
the challenge that it operates unfairly against a particular class, it ,may
be essential that the particular provision bear more than a reasonable

relation to the legislative purpose of providing compensation.

Indeed,

the provision may be scrutinized to determine whether it represents a

"compelling state interest" in order to withstand the challenge.

The

applicability of the test in resolving an equal protection issue is dependent upon the subject matter being regulated and the nature of the

regulation. Where the implicit classification of persons against whom
a statute will operate is drawn on the basis of wealth,6 7 and where the

interest involved may be described as "fundamental", 68 the provision
will be subjected to the rigid compelling state interest test. 69 On the
64. See Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1970); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 277, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963).
65. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16379-81 (West 1971).
66. Id. § 16380. Even though a judgment may be paid in very small installments,
this does not necessarily mean that the judgment-creditor will have to wait for his
award to be delivered to him piecemeal. If the judgment-creditor was covered by a
policy of liability insurance at the time of the accident he may obtain prompt compensation from his insurance carrier under the terms of the mandatory uninsured motorist
coverage. CAL. INs. CODE ANN. § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1971). See generally Chadwick & Poche, California'sUninsured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13 HAST.
L.J 194 (1961).
67. E.g., cases cited note 58 supra.
68. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See note 72 infra.
69. E.g., McDonald v. Board of Elections Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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other hand, the traditional reasonable relationship test is usually applied

in the area of economic regulation.70
The financial responsibility laws clearly discriminate on the basis

of wealth. 71 However, it is not yet settled whether this classification
alone, in the absence of a fundamental interest, will invoke the compelling state interest test. 72 As such, in testing the validity of the financial responsibility laws it is necessary to determine whether a fundamental interest is infringed by their enforcement.
In California, the nature of the interest involved in a driver's license
has been recognized as fundamental upon the theory that the right
to use the highways is inalienable. 73 Other courts have determined

that since a license is often essential for employment, it is inextricably
bound to the right of the individual to earn a livelihood. 74 Further, a
70. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 485-87 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
In Wood v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 288, 481 P.2d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr.
455 (1971), the California Supreme Court found equal protection of the law was
not denied petitioners who were required to establish credit by a cash deposit as
a condition to receipt of utility services, while property owners, persons with continued two-year employment, and others were exempt from such credit requirements.
In so holding, the court deemed the "field" to be one of economic regulation, and applied the reasonable relationship test in scrutinizing the Public Utilities Commissions'
rules. Id. at 294, 481 P.2d at 827, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
The financial responsibility laws, however, were not enacted in the "field of economic
regulation"; rather, their primary purpose is to compensate victims of negligent drivers.
See note 62 and accompanying text supra. Thus, should it be established that they
classify on the basis of wealth and infringe upon a fundamental interest, the courts,
in examining their validity, would subject them to the compelling state interest test.
See note 69 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
72. In McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), Chief
Justice Warren noted in dictum that:
[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth or race, . . . two factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting
judicial scrutiny. Id. at 807 (emphasis added).
However, an examination of those cases involving suspect classifications based upon
wealth reveals that a fundamental interest has always been involved. See, e.g., Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1971) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel). Further, in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971), the Court, in upholding a low-income housing referendum requirement
under the traditional reasonable relationship test, ignored the apparent discrimination on
the basis of wealth.
73. Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
A similar construction has been afforded in at least one other jurisdiction. People v.
Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
74. See Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1970); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869 (R.I.
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license may be considered to be an inherent part of the constitutionally

protected right to travel. 75 Urban planning, or the lack of it, and the
virtual non-existence of rapid transit systems in most areas necessitate
the use of a private
automobile in over eighty-six percent of inter-city
76

passenger traffic.

Approximately seventy-seven percent of all long-

distance passenger traffic is by automobile. 77

Thus, where social con-

ditions have made reliance upon the privately-owned automobile an
economic imperative, it would be unrealistic to insist that the suspension

provision merely deprives persons of a single mode of transport. At a
time when a premium is placed on personal mobility and when the
manner of transportation appears varied, it is perhaps easy to overlook

the fact that, for the poor, the automobile is often the sole means of
mobility. Further, when statistics verify the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases the private automobile is a necessary incident to all personal travel, it seems apparent that the suspension provision operates as an impediment to the free exercise of the right to travel.

It is not necessary that a questioned statute directly obstructs the
right to travel in order to invoke the compelling state interest standard.
Rather, it is sufficient that the statute pose merely an indirect infringe1958). See generally Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (a
state may not exclude persons from any occupation in a manner or for reasons that
contravene the Fourteenth Amendment); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956) (same); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (same). Endler v.
Schutzbank, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 169, 436 P.2d 297, 302, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1968):
"[TIbe Fourteenth Amendment protects the pursuit of one's profession from abridgement by arbitrary state action. . . ." Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57
Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.2d 101, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962).
75. Cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
[Tlhe nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout . . . our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict
this movement. Id. at 629.
This constitutional right . . . is not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and control under conventional due process or equal protection standards ...
Like the right of association . . . it is a virtually unconditional personal right,
guaranteed by the Constitution to us all. Id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1867); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 491-92 (1849); Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protection and Application Under the Constitution, 40
U.M.K.C. L. Rav. 66 (1971).
76. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1971 STATIsTicAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

77. Id. at 203.
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ment upon the free exercise of the right. 78 Though the Supreme
Court has not yet indicated what would constitute a compelling state
interest where retention of a driver's license is involved, it seems clear

that the state's interest in providing a solvent defendant for persons involved in auto accidents cannot be considered so compelling as to

warrant the suspension of an allegedly negligent person's driver's license.

Further, while providing compensation for victims of highway

accidents is a legitimate goal of the police power, 7 this goal may not
be achieved by legislative means which broadly deny individuals their

fundamental interests when the ends can be more narrowly attained. 0
A less onerous alternative to suspension for failure to provide security
is available in the form of a state unsatisfied judgment fund. Such a
fund has been adopted in other states8 ' and would function in the same

manner as the current suspension provision, without the harsh penalty
of suspension. Judgment-creditors would be guaranteed prompt payment from the fund, which would then be subrogated to the rights of
the judgment-creditor.

The fund would be reimbursed by the negli-

gent driver, who would be permitted to make payments under the installment section of the Vehicle Code.82

Additionally, the state might

also consider a form of risk distribution similar to workmen's compensation as a substitute for the current financial responsibility scheme. 88
78. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). But see id. at 650 (Warren,
CJ., dissenting); id. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson:
Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 989, 997-98, 1012 (1969);
Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 810 (1st Cir. 1970).
79. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Farmer v. Killingsworth, 102 Ariz. 44, 424 P.2d 172 (1967); Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869 (R.I. 1958).
80. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969) (a one-year waiting period
initiated as a safeguard against fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits was held invalid
because less drastic means were available). The Court stated in Shapiro that "it is
unreasonable to accomplish this objective by the blunderbuss method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers for an entire year." Id. at 637. Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (governmental purposes, even though legitimate and substantial, may not .be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when less drastic means are available); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349, 354 (1951) (a discriminatory statute is invalid, even though enacted in exercise
of state or local power to protect health and safety, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives are available).
81. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 66%, §§ 7-601 to 7-635 (1970 & Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT.
ANN. ch. 6, tit. 39, §5 61-91 (1961 & Supp. 1971-72); N.Y. INS. LAw ANN. art. 17-A,
§§ 600-26 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1971-72); N.D. CODE ANN. ch. 39-17, §§ 1-10
(1960 & Supp. 1971).
82. See notes 65-66 supra.
83. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
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Due Processand Summary Suspension

The California Vehicle Code provides a summary procedure for
determining whether an operator's license and an owner's registration
should be suspended for failure to deposit security following an accident.8 4 The normal administration of the suspension provisions elimi-

nates any hearing or determination of fault prior to suspension.
Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles,

5

In

the California Supreme

Court upheld this summary proceeding, recognizing that the Code does
not "necessarily" provide a hearing prior to suspension for failure to
provide security" 8 Rather, what was contemplated under the Code was
a summary suspension subject to subsequent judicial review.87 Although
the court described the use of the public highways for travel as a funda-

mental right,88 and not merely a privilege, 9 it nevertheless determined
(1932), proposing a traffic-accident analogue to the workmen's compensation programs. See also Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim-A Voluntary Compensation Plan, 43 CALEF. L. REV. 1 (1955).
84. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16080, 16100 (West 1971).
85. 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
86. Id. at 870, 222 P.2d at 1. In Escobedo, the court noted that while CAL.
VEts. CODE ANN. § 315, as amended, CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 13950-53 (West
1971), provided a pre-suspension hearing upon written request, such hearings were
expressly denied where suspension was mandatory. Since suspension for failure to
deposit security following an accident was mandatory, the court determined that "it
was not contemplated that the department necessarily should give an operator
opportunity to be heard before it determined the amount of security required and
notified him that his license would be suspended unless he deposited such sum." 35
Cal. 2d at 875, 222 P.2d at 4-5.
87. Id. at 877, 222 P.2d at 5.
88. Id. at 875, 222 P.2d at 5.
89. Id. Earlier decisions, generally dealing with the suspension of license and registration for failure to pay judgments arising out of auto accidents, justified the suspension as a legitimate exercise by the state of its power to revoke a conditional privilege.
By denominating the operator's license as a privilege, the state could subject the grant
to conditions with little or no regard for the interests of the licensee. E.g., Watson v.
Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 283, 298 P. 481, 483 (1931); Serenko v.
Bright, 263 Cal. App. 2d 682, 70 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); La Plante v. State Bd. of Pub.
Rds., 47 R.I. 258, 260-61, 131 A. 641, 642-43 (1926), disapproved in Berberian v.
Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 872 (R.I. 1958).
Although the "right" vs. "privilege" dichotomy still persists, it is no longer widely
held that the individual's interest, whether described as a "privilege," "property right,"
"entitlement" or "necessary incident to the right to travel," may be terminated without
observance of due process of law. See Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380
P.2d 136 (1963) (license interwoven with right to use highways); Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950) (license interwoven
with the right to use highways); Hughes v. Department of Pub. Safety, 79 So. 2d 129
(La. 1955) (license held to be a privilege, though it may not be terminated capriciously); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869 (R.L 1958) (use of highways held to be a
right in the nature of a liberty and a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood
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that this "primary right of the individual" could be abrogated without a
hearing. A summary suspension was not inconsistent with the demands
of procedural due process where the denial of a hearing was reasonably
justified by a compelling public interest. a0 The court found a compelling public interest appeared from the obvious carelessness and
financial irresponsibility of a substantial number of drivers as well as
from the administrative burdens which the court foresaw if the state was
required to provide hearings for all persons failing to meet the security
requirements.91
in modem life); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.W. 579 (1930)
held to be a right).

(travel

See also 1 K. DAVIs, ADMnI'STRATiVE LAW TREATIS E §§

7.10-7.13 (1958); O'Keefe, The Indigent Motorist and the Constitution, 4 S. CAL. L.
REV. 253 (1931); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. 733, 790 (1964). Cf.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 335
(1969); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
In a recent case, the argument was made unsuccessfully that even if a driver's license is not an interest protected from unreasonable state interference by the specific
guarantees of liberty and property in the Fifth Amendment, it is nevertheless within
the "penumbras, formed by emanations from the Bill of Rights guarantees." Brief
for Petitioner, at 38-9, Perez v. Campbell, 421 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1970), quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876, 222 P.2d 1, 5

(1950).

91. Id. at 877, 222 P.2d at 5-6. In support of its contention that the denial Of a
hearing would not violate due process if reasonably justified by a compelling public
interest, the court cited Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937), and Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). In Phillips, a public interest was found in the
immediate collection of revenues by the federal government. Id. at 598. In Bourlois,
immediate protection of the public health was the compelling public interest, justifying
regulation or prohibition of injurious cosmetic preparations without prior hearing. 301
U.S. at 189. The public interest in guaranteeing the eventual indemnification of judgment-creditors in automobile cases, however, certainly appears to be of a less urgent
nature. In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959), the Court, by way of dicta,
questioned whether the national security justified revocation of an engineer's security
clearance without a full hearing. People v. Noggle, 7 Cal. App. 2d 14, 45 P.2d 430
(1935), involved a situation where the suspension of a driver's license was due to the
licensee's physical disability. The court held that the statute should be construed to
require notice and a hearing prior to revocation despite "the urgency of unusual circumstances." Id. at 20, 45 P.2d at 433. Hearings and notice were required in spite of the
threat to public safety.
A contrary constructi6n. . . would be in conflict with the established rule of law
and good reason requiring all quasi-judicial boards possessing a sound discretion in
passing upon facts to act fairly and impartially in so doing after notice and an opportunity has been afforded the licensee to present evidence with relation thereto
for the consideration of the board. Id. at 17-18, 45 P.2d at 432.
Accord, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941) (due process does not require a hearing
at any particular point in an administrative proceeding so long as a hearing is held
before the final order becomes effective).
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The denial of a hearing prior to suspension did not, the court contended, necessarily subject the innocent as well as the negligent operator
to the statutory penalty.
The statute did not require security of every operator who might be
involved in an accident, but only of those against whom, in the opinion
of the department, a judgment might be recovered. Inasmuch as the
recovery of a judgment depends, in theory at least, upon culpability,
it would seem that the statute, presumptively properly administered,
that under it the non-culpable were subject
was not open to the objection
92
discrimination.
to arbitrary
If, in the Department's opinion, a driver involved in an accident was not
at fault, he would be spared the necessity of depositing security. Nevertheless, the court failed to explain how, in the absence of a hearing, the
"proper administration" of the statute would enable the Department to
make a fair determination of the fault issue.
9 3 the
In Orr v. Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco,
Other factors asserted to be "compelling public interests" in past cases have included
(1) providing immediate compensation for victims of negligent drivers, (2) encouraging the voluntary purchase of liability insurance, and (3) prompt removal of negligent
drivers from the highways. See generally Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 519 (1936). Presently, none of these factors are widely regarded as constituting a "compelling public interest," although the
safety consideration was hotly debated and still has some support from the bench. See
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
In California, providing "immediate compensation" to the victim of negligent drivers
is the least substantial of the above considerations. The amount deposited as security
may not be disbursed to injured victims unless there is a final judgment rendered
against the driver on whose behalf the security is deposited or a settlement agreement
is entered into. CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. § 16026 (West 1971). Where the amount deposited as security may remain untouched for years until there is an adjudication of
liability, it can hardly be argued that the speed of compensation is either "immediate"
or constitutes a compelling public interest justifying curtailment of procedural due
process. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 282, 380 P.2d 136, 142 (1963).
Although many of the early decisions justified provisions of financial responsibility
statutes on grounds that the statutory scheme was a proper exercise of police power
to promote highway safety, it is no longer widely held that safety is the purpose of
such statutes. Rather, the function of financial responsibility laws is to provide a
fund from which victims of highway accidents may eventually be compensated. "[Tihe
only purpose of the [Georgia financial responsibility] provisions before us is to
obtain security from which to pay judgments against the licensee resulting from the
accident . . ." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971). Accord, Schecter v.
Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix
Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1-956); Mission Ins. Co. v. Feldt, 62 Cal.
2d 97, 396 P.2d 709 (1964); Williams v. Sills, 55 NJ. 178, 260 A.2d 505 (1970).
92. 35 Cal. 2d 870, 878, 222 P.2d 1, 6 (1950).
93. 71 Cal. 2d 220, 454 P.2d 712, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1969).
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Department of Motor Vehicles sought to prohibit and restrain the
superior court from taking further action against the Department in a
suit brought by a group of uninsured motorists who sought the restoration of driving privileges and licenses and the declaration that certain
Vehicle Code sections were unconstitutional. The drivers contended that
the suspension provisions were unconstitutional as applied to them in
the absence of a prior finding of probable fault. They further sought
a reappraisal of the Escobedo holding in regard to the issue of procedural due process. 4 The Department, on the other hand, argued that the
issue of culpability was irrelevant to the security requirement, and that
mere involvement in an accident was sufficient basis for applying the
statute.9 5 Reaffirming the construction given the statute in Escobedo,
the Orr court ruled that a license and registration suspension must be
preceded by a departmental determination that there exists a "reasonable
possibility" of a judgment being obtained against the driver.90 As outlined by the court, however, the nature of the inquiry regarding fault
nowhere approximated a hearing with the usual procedural safeguards
-notice of an impending state action and the reasons therefor, and a
hearing with the right to confront the accuser, to cross-examine witnesses,
and to produce evidence on one's own behalf.97 Rather, the Department
is required only to arrive at its conclusion on the basis of accident reports which must be submitted by the drivers involved9" and by reviewing other evidence submitted in accordance with sections 16020 and
16024 of the Vehicle Code.99 The Department is not required to make
a finding allocating fault where conflicting claims are made.
94. Id. at 222, 224, 454 P.2d at 714, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 817, 819.
95. Id. at 222-23, 454 P.2d at 713-14, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18.
96. Id. at 226, 454 P.2d at 716, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 820. It is noteworthy that the
same reasoning applied by the Escobedo and Orr courts was utilized by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey to require a pre-suspension hearing. The New Jersey court held,
however, that the department merely had to find a reasonable possibility of fault
and that the hearing was required only upon request by the licensee. Williams v.
Sills, 55 N.J. 178, 181, 260 A.2d 505, 509 (1970).
97. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The extent to which these protections must be available in any given case depends upon the nature of both the governmental function and the private interests involved. Id. at 263.
98. 71 Cal. 2d at 227, 454 P.2d at 716, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 820; CAL. VEH. CODE ANN.
§ 16000 (West 1971).
99. 71 Cal. 2d at 227, 454 P.2d at 716, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 820; CAL. Van. CoDn
ANN. §§ 16020, 16024 (West 1971). Section 16020 refers to evaluation of evidence
submitted by a party or on his behalf within fifty days following the accident. Apparently the purpose of the section is to enable persons involved in automobile accidents to submit evidence to the Department tending to establish the substance of their
claims and the extent of their injuries. Section 16024 refers to reduction of the amount
ordered to be deposited if, in the judgment of the Department, the amount is excessive
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[I]f there is any credible evidence on the basis of which [the driver]
could reasonably be considered culpable, such evidence, which could
be believed by the trier of fact in a lawsuit, will suffice to support a determination that it is reasonably possible that a judgment may be recovered against the driver.' 0 0
The availability of an affirmative defense, such as contributory negligence or last clear chance, "if at all close or intricate," will not serve as
In the suba basis for challenging the Department's determination.'
sequent review of the order for security, the reviewing court is limited
to the issue of whether the evidence before the Department supports an
implied finding that there exists a reasonable possibility that a judgment
for damages may result.102 In summary, Escobedo and Orr hold that,
while fault is a relevant issue in determining whether suspension should
be invoked for failure to deposit security, a hearing on this issue 10may
3
justifiably be denied due to the administrative burdens involved.
It is questionable whether the California summary suspension procedure is consonant with the holding of the United States Supreme Court
in Bell v. Burson. 0 4 There, the suspension provision of the Georgia
financial responsibility laws was challenged on the ground that the
statute denied procedural due process. 10 5 The Georgia Act is substantially the same as the California enactment with respect to the requirement of depositing security following an accident. In the absence of a
deposit, or unless the driver can qualify for an exemption by showing
insurance coverage, bond or otherwise, the license, registration and license plates of the driver and of the owner of any motor vehicle involved
in an accident will be suspended. 0 6 Unlike the California statute,
Presumably the Department would base such a decision upon the evidence received from
the driver which would tend to discredit the evidence submitted by the other party.
100. 71 Cal. 2d at 227, 454 P.2d at 716, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (1969).
101. Id. at 227-28, 454 P.2d at 717, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
102. Id.
103. Accord, Perez v. Tynan, 307 F. Supp. 1235 (D.C. Conn. 1969) (applying Connecticut law); State v. Finley, 198 Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251, rev'd on other grounds, 199
Kan. 615, 433 P.2d 414 (1967); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869 (R.I. 1958);
Gillaspie v. Department of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 933 (1954); State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).
But see Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963) (construing
the financial responsibility statutes to require a pre-suspension hearing, and thereby
avoiding an invalidation of the statutes). Contra, People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180
(Colo. 1961) (security suspension was struck down as constituting a denial of procedural due process).
104. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
105. Id. at 536.
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-605 (1958 & Supp. 1971). Suspension will not be im-
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Georgia provides an administrative hearing prior to involving the suspension provisions.' 0 7 However, the Georgia Department of Public
Safety assumed a position similar to the contention of the California
Department of Motor Vehicles in Orr and maintained that fault was a
completely irrelevant issue at the hearing.' 0 8 The Bell Court noted that
regardless of whether a license is described as a right or a privilege, once
it is issued the license becomes a personal interest of such importance
that it cannot be taken away without observance of the protections of
procedural due process. 10 9 The sole issue before the Court, therefore,
was whether procedural due process was afforded by a pre-suspension
hearing which excluded a consideration of fault.
It is fundamental that the requirements of due process must remain
malleable in order to provide greater or lesser protection, depending
upon the nature of the case." 0 In deciding whether due process
standards have been adhered to, the courts must determine the precise
nature of both the policy behind the governmental action and the individual interest which will be affected, and then balance the interests,
one against the other."' In Bell, the Court observed that a pre-suspension hearing which excluded issues of fault would have been approposed, however, if the owner or operator had in effect at the time of the accident an
insurance policy or bond covering liability, or if the owner or operator qualifies as a
self-insurer. Id. § 92A-605(a) & (c). Nor will suspension be imposed if only the
owner or operator was injured, if the vehicle was parked legally at the time of the accident, if the vehicle was being operated without the consent of the owner, or if satisfactory evidence is filed with the Director showing a release from liability, a settlement
agreement providing for installment payments, or an adjudication of nonliability. Id.
§ 92A-606 (1958).
107. Id. § 92A-602 (1958).
108. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971).
109. Id. at 539:
Once licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are
not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(wage garnishment) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits).
110. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960):
[Als a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules
of fair play, which through the years, have become associated with differing types
of proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in
a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the
alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on
that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1908).
111. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). See Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 888, 895 (1961).
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priate to the nature of the case if fault and liability were irrelevant to
the statutory scheme.' 12 However, since the Georgia statute did not
operate against those persons who obtained either a release from liability
or an adjudication on nonliability prior to suspension, fault remained an
important factor in the Georgia Act. 11 3 It is well settled that where
a hearing is required by the Due Process Clause, it must be a "meaningful" hearing." 4 This standard of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
met where a hearing to determine whether a license shall be suspended
fails to consider the essential factor of fault. While due process does not
demand that in such cases a court trial with the "full panoply of judicial
procedures" be provided, 1 5 more than the hearing offered under the
Georgia statute is called for. As stated by the Bell Court:
Clearly . . . the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the
licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the
question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation
between the parties involved in the accident. Since the only purpose
of the provisions before us is to obtain security from which to pay any
judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold
that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the
judgments
determination whether there is a reasonable probability of
6
licensee."1
the
against
rendered
being
claimed
amounts
in the
The language of the holding in Bell appears to substantiate the holding of the California Supreme Court in Orr: Prior to the suspension of a
driver's license there must be an "inquiry" concerning the driver's culpability."17 Consideration of this issue does not amount to an adjudication
of liability, but rather is limited to a determination of whether there
exists a reasonable possibility of liability. However, two factors in Bell
distinguish that case from the Orr decision. In Bell, the Supreme Court
reviewed a statutory scheme which expressly made provision for a hearing. At issue was the scope of the hearing demanded by procedural due
process. It was assumed by all parties that at least some form of hearing
would be provided to the petitioner. Thus, while the holding of the
Court naturally did not emphasize the right to a hearing prior to suspension, it is apparent from the language of the opinion that a presuspension hearing was an element of due process." 31
112. 402 U.S. at 541.
113. Id.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 541, citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
402 U.S. at 540 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
The fact that the Court considered an expanded hearing of some variety to be
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It is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not
one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an
interest such as that here involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the
termination becomes effective. 119
The Orr court, on the other hand, reaffirmed the earlier California
ruling in Escobedo that a hearing was not required,' 20 and determined
that the Department's inquiry on the issue of fault could be made on
the basis of accident reports and other submitted evidence.' 2'
A second point of contrast between Bell and Orr exists in the different weight afforded by each court to the increased administrative expenses necessarily involved in providing pre-suspension hearings. In
Orr,the California court ruled that this burden constituted a compelling
public interest justifying the denial of a hearing. 1 22 On the other hand,
the Bell Court expressly rejected the application of such reasoning to the
circumstances involved in license suspensions, finding that the administrative burden involved in providing procedural due process is not a
valid ground for denial of a hearing. 2 3 While the protections of due
process may be abridged in an emergency, the Court found that an
emergency did not exist in the enforcement of Georgia's financial responsibility laws.' 24 Thus, despite a superficial consistency between Bell
and Orr, the necessary implication of the former decision is that a presuspension hearing is required by the Due Process Clause. As such,
essential appears from the following statements of the Court: "While the problem of
additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting
the ordinary standards of due process." 402 U.S. at 540-41 (1971), citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); and "Mhe hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful."' 402 U.S. at 541, citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545 (1965). In Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25 (1971), the Supreme Court
once again underscored the importance of a meaningful hearing prior to suspension.
There, the Court upheld the suspension of appellant's driver's license, finding no need
to examine the Utah statutory scheme in question which, on its face, failed to afford
the hearing required by Bell. Because the federal district court had accorded appellant
a full hearing on the issue of fault, the Supreme Court saw no need to finally adjudge
the validity of the Utah statutes. Id. at 26.
119. 402 U.S. at 542 (footnote omitted).
120. Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
121. 71 Cal. 2d at 227, 454 P.2d at 716-17, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21 (1969).
122. Id. at 224, 454 P.2d at 714, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 818, quoting Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876-77, 222 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1950); accord, Turner
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App. 2d 649, 71 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1968).
123. 402 U.S. at 540-41.
124. Id. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that increased
expenses involved in providing procedural due process is not a valid ground for denial
of a hearing).
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Bell compels a fresh evaluation of the validity of the financial responsibility laws by the California courts.
The Escobedo,and Orr decisions represent something of an anomaly
in the California courts' historical approach to similar due process issues outside the area of the financial responsibility laws. 125 In Escobedo,

the majority opinion found it necessary to distinguish a series of past
decisions invalidating summary procedures similar to the procedure authorized in California Vehicle Code sections 16080 and 16100.126 Al-

though these cases had uniformly required a hearing prior to the suspension of a license, and thus appeared to disapprove of the denial of

a hearing under the financial responsibility laws, the Escobedo court
nevertheless declined to regard the cases as controlling. 127 However, in
light of the current expansive judicial application of the Due Process

Clause, the apparent wisdom of those earlier decisions cannot now be
denied.
In Sniadachv. Family Finance Corp.,' the Supreme Court held that
a prejudgment wage garnishment statute violated a debtor's right to due

process by sanctioning the taking of his property without notice and
prior hearing. 129 Subsequently, a series of Supreme Court decisions
have applied the"Sniadach rationale to invalidate the denial of fault in-

quiries prior to the suspension of a license,

30

the refusal of a state to

admit indigents to its courts for divorce purposes,' 3 ' the public identification of an individual as being an excessive drinker, 3 2 and the withdrawal of welfare benefits. 33 The expansive reach of the Due Process

Clause, however, does not stop short of the financial responsibility laws.
The effect of the security provision in the financial responsibility laws is
125. See, e.g., Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1966); Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal. 2d 260, 246 P.2d 656 (1952); Ratliff v.
Lampton, 32 Cal. 2d 226, 195 P.2d 792 (1948); Steen v. Board of Civil Service
Comm'rs, 26 Cal. 2d 716, 160 P.2d 816 (1945); Carroll v. California Horse Racing
Bd., 16 Cal. 2d 164, 105 P.2d 110 (1940); People v. Noggle, 7 Cal. App. 2d 14, 45
P.2d 430 (1935); Martin v. Board of Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 96, 26 P.2d 843
(1933).
126. 35 Cal. 2d at 877, 222 P.2d at 6. The court distinguished Ratliff v. Lampton,
32 Cal. 2d 226, 195 P.2d 792 (1948), Carroll v. California Horse Racing Bd., 16 Cal.
2d 164, 105 P.2d 110 (1940), and People v. Noggle, 7 Cal. App. 2d 14, 45 P.2d 430
(1935).
127. 35 Cal. 2d at 877, 222 P.2d at 6 (1950).
128. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
129. Id. at 342.
130. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
131. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
132. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
133. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1969).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

closely akin to that of the garnishment statute invalidated in Sniadachwhile both are directed to assure the creditor some recovery, their net
effect is to deprive the debtor of the use of his property until there is an
adjudication on liability. As such, the failure of the laws to provide a
meaningful opportunity to be heard is clearly violative of the prevailing
standards of due process.
Commencing in 1970, the California Supreme Court effectuated the
Sniadachrule in a series of cases dealing with creditor-protective devices
of a summary nature. Wage garnishment, 134 claim and delivery, 8 6 and
attachment procedures 8 6 were all found to be constitutionally defective
because the alleged debtor was denied a hearing prior to the taking of
his property. In Randone v. Appellate Department of the Superior
Court of Alameda County,13 7 the court invalidated California Code of
Civil Procedure section 537(1), which authorized the attachment of a
debtor's property without affording him notice or prior hearing. In so
doing, the court recognized that the principles underlying Sniadach demand that individuals be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing before they can be deprived of life, liberty or property. 83 These
same principles are applicable to "the entire domain of prejudgment
remedies."' 139 Exceptions to this principle can only be justified in "extraordinary circumstances."' 40 Although "extraordinary circumstances"
could not be defined, the court listed five queries which are generally
relevant in evaluating the validity of summary procedures: (1) is the
procedure intended to benefit the general public or to serve the interests
of a private individual; (2) is the procedure only initiated by an authorized government official who could be expected to act only for the
general welfare; (3) would a delay occasioned by a prior hearing have
caused serious harm to the public; (4) is the property affected by the
procedure of vital importance in the individual's life or livelihood; and
(5) is the summary proceeding available only when great necessity
4
arises?' '
None of these queries can be answered in the affirmative regarding
134. McCallOp v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970);
Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
135. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
136. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 547, 488 P.2d at 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 541, 488 P.2d at 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
141. Id. at 554, 488 P.2d at 24-25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21.
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the security suspension provision in the financial responsibility laws.
The suspension provision was implemented and is administered for the
benefit of individuals on grounds that they may be potential judgmentcreditors. The procedure has its impact only upon individuals and,
accordingly, the grant of a pre-suspension hearing would no more affect
the public than does the present procedure. The suspension deprives an
individual of the use of property which may be essential to his livelihood 14 2 and to the exercise of his right to travel.143 And finally, suspension is imposed without regard to the degree of necessity. Under
the mandate of Randone, the summary suspension provision appears
constitutionally invalid.
I-.

CONCLUSION

A majority of the constitutional objections to the financial responsibility laws could be remedied with relative ease by minor amendments to
the Vehicle Code. Perez demands the repeal of section 16370 which
directly conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act's relief from discharged judgments. The clear implications of Bell, Sniadach, and Randone require
that suspension for failure to provide security following an accident be
construed to include a pre-suspension hearing.
Curing the security-suspension provision's unfair impact on the
poor, 44 however, poses a problem of a different nature. The invalidity
of this section would seem to affect the continued viability of the financial responsibility scheme as a device for providing compensation for
accident victims. Security provisions were adopted originally in the
hope of ending what is, in effect, the virtual immunity from legal action
enjoyed by the judgment-proof defendant. If the state can ensure a
defendant who is solvent, then the victim would no longer lack the in145
centive to commence what otherwise would be a hopeless lawsuit.
How far the present law goes toward accomplishing this goal, however,
142. See Miller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1970): "A combination of
public and private policies have made use of an automobile an actual necessity for virtually everyone who must work for a living."; Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273,
280, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963): "mhe use of the [motor] vehicle is so essential
to both a livelihood and the enjoyment of life . . . that the use of the highways is a
right which all qualified citizens possess. . ....
143. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
144. CAL. VFH. CODE ANN. §§ 16020, 16100 (West 1971).
145. Hayes, Are the FinancialResponsibility Laws in Need of Revision?-Two Recent Supreme Court Cases May Indicate Such a Need, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 617, 618
(1971). See R. KEETON & I. O'CoNNELI, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFIC VICTIM
103-05 (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON & O'CONNELL].
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is open to question. A financially irresponsible motorist will not likely
acquire sudden wealth simply because he is faced with suspension, nor
will he be deterred from careless driving by the threat of potential suspension. 146 Therefore, while the more economically advantaged classes
are encouraged to purchase insurance, 147 the effect of the security requirement on the poor is simply to advance the possibility of suspension
48
to a date prior to judgment.'

Although compulsory insurance would appear to offer a solution to
the problem of the judgment-proof motorist, 49 legislative proposals for
adoption of this measure have succeeded in only three states. 150 In
California, the objections which have been raised to a compulsory insurance program include the inadequacy of coverage amounts,' 5 the
absence of protection for victims of out-of-state uninsured motorists, 5 2
the inevitability of higher premium payments and, eventually, political
rate-fixing.' 53 Notwithstanding the validity of these objections, however, the fact remains that financial responsibility laws have not provided a successful alternative.. 4 As presently administered, the financial responsibility program falls far short of accomplishing its purported
purpose of assuring compensation to highway accident victims. And
without the security-suspension provision, these statutes are likely to be
even less effective. Therefore, rather than attempt to revise the financial
responsibility scheme, it would be more prudent to formulate new programs which would be both constitutionally sound and efficient in their
administration.
No-fault compulsory insurance plans have been suggested as a sub146. See Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 318, 197 A. 701, 704 (1938): "[Ilt is
doubtful whether the insured owner's car, driven either by himself or another, may be
considered to be operated more carefully than one whose owner is uninsured."
147. See Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
COLUM. L. REv. 300, 311 (1950).
148. See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
149. See Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
COLUM. L. REv. 300, 312-17 (1950).
150. See note 4 supra.
151. See generally ASSEMBLY SuBCOMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT, 20 A.
INTERIM COMM. REPORTS No. 6, 11-13 (1957-58), in 3 APPENDIX TO JOUR. OF THE
ASSEMBLY, Reg. Sess. 1959); Marryott, Automobile Accidents and Financial Responsbility, 1953 INs. L.J. 758, 762 [hereinafter cited as Marryott].
152. See Marryott, supra note 151. This problem is dealt with in California
by the uninsured motorist coverage which is now made mandatory by the insurance code. CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1971).
153. See Marryott, supra note 151, at 762.
154. See A. CONARD, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); KEETON
& O'CoNNELL, supranote 145.
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stitute for financial responsibility laws.' 55 Today, automobile accident
and medical malpractice suits are the only statistically significant areas
of the law wherein traditional negligence principles continue to restrict
personal injury relief.' 56 The premium which modem society places on
personal mobility makes a certain number of auto accidents inevitable.
Rather than occurring as the result of fault, accidents on the highways
often occur simply because of the enormous number of automobiles and
the conditions which accompany this growing increase in traffic upon
the highways. 157 The burgeoning need for providing compensation has
manifestly outgrown the inherent limitations of a system which conditions
compensation upon fault, and the sole viable alternative seems to be
some form of compulsory no-fault insurance. 158 Distribution of risk
under a no-fault plan would not only expedite recovery for the victim
but would also maximize the number of victims compensated.' 59
However, compulsory insurance of any variety would necessarily
restrict the use of the automobile to those persons who are financially
capable of paying the insurance premium.' 60 And though the increased
efficiency of a no-fault compulsory insurance system would conceivably
reduce the cost of insurance,' 6 ' unless current underwriting principles
were also altered, the various proposed plans would not likely reduce the
burden imposed by the present system on disadvantaged persons. Notwithstanding the increased compensation which would be provided to
accident victims, 162 the poor would arguably be in a worse position
under compulsory insurance than under the current financial responsibility laws.
Legislative proposals for automobile insurance reform should consider possible means of accomodating the needs of accident compensation
for victims with the necessity of driver's license retention until negligence is judicially determined. In this respect, the "Full Aid" insurance
155. KEETON & O'CON'NELL, supra note 145, at 125-48; REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE KEETONO'CoNNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE AcCIDENT REPARATIONS (September 9, 1968).

156. See Cohen, Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Lost Issue in California,
12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 164, 179 (1964-65).
157. See generally James, Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 2 TRIAL, no. 2, at 25

(1966).
158. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 145, at 11-70 (1965).
159. Id. at 273-98.
160. But see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43 & n.6 (1971) (dictum), wherein
the Court recommends, inter alia, adoption of a compulsory insurance plan.
161. KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 145, at 295-98.
162. Id. at 273.
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plan proposed by Professor Ehrenzweig in 1954 might be reconsider-

ed. 16 3 Although the "Full Aid" plan is no longer in the forefront of
auto-accident compensation systems presently being considered, the plan
avoids certain problems apparently not considered under the other programs. Insurance coverage is not compulsory under Ehrenzweig's pro-

posal, but motorists are encouraged to purchase a variety of no-fault

insurance in statutory minimum amounts. 16 4 Persons injured by uninsured drivers may be compensated by a fund similar to the unsatisfied-judgment fund in effect in four states.' 65 Presumably, the
fund would be subrogated to the rights of the injured party against the
wrongdoer, and would seek reimbursement. The negligent driver would

be permitted to satisfy a judgment in installments,

6

and the economic

burden would accordingly not be as great as that imposed by compulsory

insurance. In effect, the victim would be provided with immediate compensation, while the burden on the poor would be substantially lessened.
George Peterson

163. Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim-A Voluntary Corn.
pensation Plan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1955).
164. Id. at 37:
(1) Any owner or operator of an automobile who carries "full aid" accident insurance in statutory minimum amounts for all injuries inflicted by the operation of
his vehicle would, under a new Automobile Insurance Law, be relieved from his
common-law liability for ordinary (in contrast to criminal) negligence.
(2) Any person, except a member of the injurer's own family, injured by a car
not so insured, and otherwise unable to recover for his harm (because the injurer
is either not liable or insolvent), would be entitled to recover the same amounts
from an uncompensated-injury fund which would be administered by the automobile
insurers licensed in the state.
165. See note 81 supra.
166. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §§ 16379-81 (West 1971).

